AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS
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Thank you very much Dick, ladies and gentlemen. I appreciate your kind words of introduction Dick, but I wish you hadn't exposed that I was a Naval Academy classmate of the President, I wanted people to think I got the job on merit. In thinking about your society I realized that we have a number of things in common between the Society of Civil Engineers and the Central Intelligence Agency. You may not think so but I understand one of the functions your Society performs is to ferret out, to analyze and to disseminate to the civil engineering community of our country information that is of use to civil engineers and also to the profession and its application in our country. And clearly, that's one of the principal elements of intelligence, finding information, analyzing it, and disseminating it to our policy makers.

You have two advantages over us. First, whatever you deal with is unclassified and you have no problems with how you disseminate it; and the second is, when you are finished, there's a dam, a building, a monument, something tangible and visible to show or display, and it has a role in our society. With us, the end product is that advice, that guidance to our policy makers, has to be done quietly and unobtrusively. We have no way of getting credit, we don't want or need it. But it means that this is a sometimes difficult, but very fascinating profession for the ones who have joined the United States Intelligence Community. Let me talk to you for a few minutes today about the role that the Intelligence Community of our country plays for all of us. Let me talk

about what the intelligence professional believes that we require in order to fulfill our role successfully. And, finally, let me talk about what the society of our country requires in order to ensure that we are fulfilling our role and that we are doing nothing else.

First, intelligence, in my view, is more important to our country today that any time since 1947 when we organized a centralized intelligence function. Back then we were the dominant military power in the world. We were quite independent economically, and we were the driving political force on the world scene. Now today, we are still the preeminent military, political, and economic force in the world. We now, however, must recognize that there are many events with respect to the security and well-being of our country which are beyond our own nation's controls. This is especially the case because military powers are continuing to proliferate. The world is becoming more interdependent economically and even some of the newest nations are showing great political independence and activism. These forces of military power, economic interdependence, and political independence, often prompt a government to take actions which are deliberately inimical to those of the United States, or which out of their own selfishness, disregard the impact they will have on other international powers. And frequently, when countries take actions of these sorts they deliberately do it in secret. This means that if we're going to have a strong and secure country, we're going to have policy makers who are able to make the best decisions possible, we need to know much about what is going on in the rest of the world. We cannot enter into negotiations for arms control with other nations if we don't have some concept of what is happening in

another country with whom we are negotiating. We don't know what kinds of resources they are dedicating to their defense program, what their plans and intentions are. And surely you would not want us to make an agreement to control the arms of this country unless we in the Intelligence Community could give reasonable assurance that we can check, monitor and tell whether that agreement is being enforced. Now in the best of all possible worlds, where people are open and forthright with each other, you wouldn't need to get information by spying. But all of us here know that's not the kind of world we're in today. Many, if not most of the societies around us harbor closed elements. They are not willing to transfer and exchange information. And hence, the primary role of your Intelligence Community is to obtain good foreign intelligence, to know what is going on in other countries.

The second role is the obverse of that coin. It is simply to prevent others from stealing our secrets. We call that counterintelligence. Now ours is the most open society in the world and there aren't too many secrets that are left to be stolen. But nonetheless, if we are going to be prepared for possible inimical actions of other countries against us, there are certain things which we simply must do in secret. We cannot afford to develop expensive new weapons systems or systems for collecting intelligence and then expose them to the public, although frequently countermeasures can be taken which will greatly reduce the value of those systems. We cannot afford to enter into negotiations for arms control and tip our hand in advance. Hence, we must have some capability to counter the efforts of others to obtain our secrets and an ability to prevent or frustrate those actions. This is our second role, counterintelligence.

Our third is covert political action. Covert political action is the attempt to influence the course of events in a foreign country without the source of that influence being identifiable. This is not really an intelligence function. Intelligence is the gathering and analysis of information. But since its founding in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency has been charged by the Congress and the President with carrying out any covert political action this country decides it wants to take. Now I am frequently asked today, why in the present atmosphere should we have covert political action. Now I must say as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, I have looked at that very carefully because here is where the Agency has taken the greatest number of brickbats in recent history. I consider that there is a case for a political action capibility simply because this country has been dedicated from the founding of the Republic to avoiding the use of military force if we can preserve our security and our national interest in other ways. Clearly we prefer negotiations, diplomacy, the use of economic pressure, and so on. These kind of influence are the preferred course of action for this country, but there are instances in which attempts to influence foreign countries are much more effective if you believe that the pressures, the influences, are coming from within and, in fact, if it is identified that the pressures are from without, frequently they will be of no value or no import. Let me give you a couple of examples.

Take the case of a hypothetical democratic country in which there is a strong and growing Communist party. Take the case where by intelligence we are confident that Communist party is being supported financially and otherwise through the Soviet embassy in that country.

What does the United States do? We'd be willing to provide assistance to the democratic elements in countering and making their case before the public of that nation. Clearly it's a difficult choice. The answer isn't always yes, the answer isn't necessarily always no. There are some instances in the past when support from the United States, in such instances has made the difference between freedom and totalitarianism. This is the kind of political action--not an effort to rig the elections of these countries--it's simply an effort to make the democratic elements capable of making their case before their publics. Another instance is a growing problem in the world today--international terrorism and narcotics trafficking--and in both of these cases as well we find it is important that we be able not only to infiltrate these organizations and to find out what they are going to do, but to attempt to influence them, and attempt to divert their activities so that we don't experience these terrifying international incidents. This, too, is covert action.

So these are the three basic roles that intelligence plays for our country--collecting foreign intelligence information about activities abroad, conducting counterintelligence to preserve our own secrets, and carrying out such covert political actions as are authorized by our government. Now what do we as professionals need in order to do these things successfully. Well first, we need the support, the understanding of the American public. We're a democratic country and no institution such as ours will endure and be successful if it does not have support. In years past we've had it, we've had it on faith, on the faith that this country did need to do some things in secret and that the Central Intelligence Agency was the best organization to do that. The exposures,

the allegations of recent years have shaken that faith. Today I believe that the American public deserves to build its future faith in our Intelligence Community on a firmer foundation. Accordingly, we are trying to explain more what we do, and why we do it. My presence with you here today is evidence of our commitment to be as open with the American public as we possibly can be.

Having said that, the second imperative of a good intelligence activity is the ability of the nation to keep secrets. If that sounds contradictory to you, let me explain. Openness is one of the greatest strengths of the democratic process. We want to draw on that strength to the maximum extent that we can. On the other hand, our government, any government, you, any individual, any business firm, has some need for secrets. Intelligence is no exception to that. It is vital to carrying on its activities in the modern society today. And yet you know, I know that there are, there have been too many secrets in our government. There are too many documents classified as Secret or Top Secret, or whatever it may be. So a problem of openness on the one hand which leads to the downgrading of material which is unnecessarily categorized as Secret, and tightening up on security procedures on the other, is what we need today. We are, by being more open, helping to reduce the corpus of classified information so that we can garner within the government real respect for that which remains and must remain secret.

We need, however, more than this in order to strengthen our ability to keep secrets today. We also need an understanding of the legitimacy of having secrets. Secrets are not intrinsically moral or immoral, good

or bad. They are certainly a necessary corollary in the world in which we live today. Unfortunately, in my view, there has come to be a view in this country which automatically says that those of us who are attempting to preserve secrets are doing so for ulterior purposes of covering up, and those who are so-called whistleblowers are heroes. Let me just say to you that as there are procedures for keeping secrets, there are authorized procedures today for complaining about the abuse of secrecy within our government. And I have yet to see a so-called whistleblower who took advantage of, who prevailed upon those procedures for complaining about undue secrecy. In short, if they go to the press first and overlook those procedures, I'm suspicious that it's fame and fortune, rather than improving the system, are more their motivations. Now this does not mean that those of us required by law and by conviction to preserve secrets, feel that the public must simply take us on our word. Not so at all. The risk of improper use of secrecy, the risk of improper functioning of the intelligence process in our country, are very considerable and we fully recognize that. There is a risk of people violating human rights. Although our Bill of Rights only applies to American citizens, it clearly would be against the interests of our country if the Intelligence Community systematically violated international human rights. This would weaken the position of the United States as an exemplary and that is a very important thing.

Beyond that there are risks to the rights and privacy of the individual American citizen. Rights can be violated intentionally or accidentally. But in either case, it's very important that we have checks and balances and control to ensure that that does not happen.

Out of the last 3-1/2 years of intense public criticism of intelligence and its activities, what we have done is to forge a series of control procedures to prevent that kind of thing. There are basically four such controls. There are guidelines, there are specific prohibitions, there are injunctions, and there are oversight mechanisms. Let me describe each one very briefly.

There are two basic guidelines which govern all of our intelligence activities. The first is that espionage must be viewed as an extraordinary activity, one of last resort. Clearly we should not attempt to spy with technical intelligence systems to obtain information that can be obtained by open or overt means. And clearly in each instance when we apply the intelligence process of obtaining information, we must carefully weigh what the risks to the country and its reputation will be versus the benefits to the country of having that information. The second principle is that we, the intelligence professional, must be able to defend in public the kinds of activities in which we engage. Now clearly we cannot come to the public and say, this is a specific thing we are going to do or want to do, because most of those things must be done in secret. But I believe we can, now and again, discuss the general kinds of activities that we undertake and assure the public that what we are doing is in conformance with the policies and objectives of our society as established in the democratic process. On top of that, I'll come back to this in a minute, we can explain those procedures or activities in much greater detail, of course, in the halls of Congress under classified aegis.

Prohibitions, our second form of controls, there are just some activities which are just so repugnant to American values, that we can prohibit them entirely. Assassination is one of those and it is totally proscribed today. There are, of course, others but there aren't very many others that we can put on a list of flat prohibitions. Why? Because circumstances change and we need some flexibility. What you will do in peacetime, what you will do in a democratic society, may be quite different from what you will do in wartime or what you will do in a totalitarian society.

In short, the third form of control over us are injunctions. Injunctions which are a general prohibition against doing a certain type of activity plus a very specific procedure for authorizing when the circumstances are appropriate. For instance, we can have injunctions against using members of the American media as agents of intelligence and we do have such an injunction which I have issued. However, put yourself in the position of one of our control stations in some foreign country and he's about to try to frustrate an international terrorist operation. But he finds that his only avenue into that operation is the stringer of an American news agency based in that country. Now we do not want that injunction to be a flat prohibition or law which prohibits a use like that in an extraordinary circumstance. And so, we're trying to find the right balance and to take these various procedures of intelligence and for each one establish different thresholds for each individual problem of approval or clearance. This is really nothing new, nothing unusual in our society. It accords with the basic way in which we balance the government's interests in obtaining information

with what is law and protecting to the rights of citizens. There is no one of us here would tolerate a policeman trying to search our home without a proper warrant. And so we have these analagous procedures, some of which include provisions for carrying out intelligence activities.

Now guidelines, prohibitions, and injunctions are not enough. There must be also a mean for checking on how the process is working, whether they are being enforced in the way which was intended. And this leads us to what we call the oversight procedures. There are basically three of these which have been established. The first is a much more personal and and active role of our President today in intelligence proper. He's kept very well informed of what we are doing, he takes a very personal role in it. The second is under the President, an Intelligence Oversight Board. A group of three prominent American citizens; former Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton, and Mr. Tom Farmer of Washington, D.C. They report only to the President, they're concerned only with the legality and the propriety of what the Intelligence Community is doing. And finally, within the last two years there has been established in Congress oversight committees for intelligence; one in the Senate and one in the House of Representatives. They are helping me and they are helping me well. We find them very cooperative, very helpful in giving us guidance. On the other hand, we find that they stand out from us and note that they conduct a very thorough and rigorous oversight and investigation of anything we have done. Most of us in the Intelligence Community have found that there are really positive values to this Congressional oversight. There is nothing like accountability to keep you on your toes. And particularly in our

business, the risks are high, the gains seem very valuable in many cases. Patriotism is what drives people and yet we have to be cautious, And knowing you are going to have to account for how you balance the risks and the benefits is important. You can't, however, have a situation which leads to intelligence by timidity. I don't believe that... (tape turned)... amend, append and legislate what will be known as charters for the Intelligence Community, the framework of guidelines, prohibitions, injunctions, and oversight procedures which will govern what we do and how we do it. I welcome that. I strongly support it. I believe this will, on the one hand, give us the legal foundation for what we do. On the other hand, it will provide to our intelligence officers in the field and to those of us at headquarters, the basic moods, the basic expectations of what the country wants from us, what we can and cannot do and how we must be accountable for our actions.

It's a very exciting time for us in the Intelligence Community because around us we are evolving what I call a new American model of intelligence. A uniquely American construction intended to protect the values of our society both by regulations on the intelligence function and by providing the strength for that intelligence function which will keep it effective, as surely it must be today. Part of that effectiveness, a big part of it, is the interest, the concern and the support of the American public. I'm grateful that you have shown your interest and support by having me here with you today. Thank you so much.

Q: I'd like to ask the Admiral if he would I make any comments on the surveillance of public covert operations in the United States.

A: You mean by foreign powers? Yes I can. I'll pass that buck entirely to my close friend and college classmate, Bill Webster, the Director of the FBI. There's a clear dividing line, two of them. One is between law enforcement and intelligence, and if they are doing something which is illegal, we'll discuss the case with the FBI law enforcement regime. And the other is between counterintelligence in the United States itself and counterintelligence overseas. The CIA is responsible overseas, the FBI in the United States. It means that if an agent is going to do something illegal in our country, leaves a foreign station and comes over here, we have to pass the baton between us as he crosses mid-Atlantic or mid-Pacific. It means there must be close cooperation between the CIA and the FBI and I'm very pleased to report to you that that does exist today in a very workable way on both sides.

Q: I was fascinated by a book called "A Man Called Intrepid." Have you read that book Admiral, and are we today doing things that were done before in the United States, that is World War II, as described in that book?

A: I think the answer is basically yes to that. The world of intelligence has changed remarkably in the 35 years or so since the war took place. Among other things, we have become today increasingly reliant on what we call technical means of collecting intelligence--photographs and satellites, stations and intercept signals--going around the world, as well as the traditional human intelligence agent or spy. And what is different today is that while we need the traditional spy just as much as we did before, we must meld his activities and those of the technical collection systems together. Each one can give you a little piece of the whole picture you're trying to puzzle together (I guess it's the other way around, the puzzle you're trying to picture together, or whatever it may be.) And it's a great challenge today for us to ensure there is that knitting together, that teamwork. It's a little different than the pre-WW II days.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: How effectively will we be able to monitor a SALT agreement if it comes about. A most appropriate question. I am a very integral part of the SALT negotiating process. It is not my realm to say it's something we should do or should not do, but in the whole I'm called

upon to say can we verify it, can we not. But that isn't as black and white as all that. I don't think anyone would ever expect us to be able to say, "Well, they have just one more missile to 800." The question is, how far could they go, how long would it take before we would detect a deliberate violation. And I can say to you that while the treaty is not fully negotiated yet, that I am comfortable in my verification responsibilities as I see them evolving, but I want to wait and pass judgment when the final terms are in. You never know when differences may come at the last minute and--there's no way to verify one missile in 1500. You have to evaluate how much benefit there would be to the other side versus the risk of getting involved. I can't give you numbers on that that would be exactly precise, but surely I expect the next six months of my life to be very largely consumed with trying to explain this in concrete terms while the treaty is negotiated. But we're working on it very hard.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Well I'm not sure of the specifics you are referring to--if it's surveillance of people who fall into the same camp with us as opposed to those who do not. But clearly, our primary interest today is on the countries that are closed to us ideologically or philosophically. The other interesting development of intelligence since World War II however is that we have shifted from a almost exclusive focus on the Soviet military threat and we have had to expand our horizon to say that this country has an interest in what's going on in many, many countries of the world and many, many fields besides intelligence, besides the military intelligence. I'm not trying to say there is less Soviet military threat today, I'm saying we have a much broader scope today. But that doesn't mean that when we find that important events could happen in a country that was recently friendly with us, that they are not sharing that information. We find it a big responsibility of ours to try to determine that clearly, a closer relationship with the country, but less necessary than with that of another.

Q: Admiral, how do you view the problem of terrorism, both international and national?

A: Well, of course, that very requirement and development on the world scene is one which we published in an unclassified report to the public on in the last few years. They are not frankly optimistic reports in terms that we hope the trend will go down. There has been a downtrend in the more complicated, more sophisticated form of terrorism which is a possible hopeful sign that it's getting more risky and they are, at least, resorting to more elementary forms of terrorism. But quantitatively it's not going down and unfortunately the percentage of Americans or American property that is involved in international terrorism--while generally overseas it is still American--is high and increasing and we think that is unfortuantely

why we need to continue. Domestic terrorism again is something more in the realm of the FBI than myself. I am increasingly optimistic here, however, that the respect for law in our country and the general procedures we have established in airports for instance, is helpful and will continue to be so.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Are we involved in the international narcotics trade? Yes, with our program of satellites we can predict where crops are being grown and if the government of that country is cooperative, and some of them are, we can encourage them to destroy those crops before harvesting. Secondly, we can use the usual human intelligence means to try to find out what the narcotics rings overseas are doing, how they are sending their material towards this country. We have taken considerable steps in this direction. We've, I think, reduced the flow from South America and Mexico. We work very closely in many countries with the local intelligence or security services and give them tremendous help in finding out where the narcotics mechanisms are and how they are operating so that we work together to kill it at its source.

Q: With the criticism that has been levelled against the CIA over recent years, have you had any difficulty in obtaining the qualified personnel that the CIA needs to progress in the future?

A: There are two answers to that and I am proud to tell you that in regard to Americans joining our organization, the young college graduates have seen through the demonstrations of the minority and have continued throughout the criticism, as well as today, to sign up in the same kinds of numbers involved that we had all along, it is very encouraging. But the other half of the answer is in our ability to find people overseas, people from other countries who are willing to work with us because they believe in us and our country and its standards. If we cannot staunch the flow of secrets, if we cannot stop the leaks, cannot stop people like Agee from writing books and deliberately exposing names of our agents, we will not be able to maintain that confidence in the future and it won't show up tomorrow, it will show up five or ten years from now when we don't have the cooperation, the agents we need to do our job. Last question please.

Q: We read the Soviets have developed means of destroying satellites. How will that effectively diminish our capabilities for surveillance?

A: Again, a very appropriate question. It's one where in the satellite game, as in most forms of military warfare, you have measures and countermeasures. And almost no new military system doesn't have this counter that can, over time, be developed. We're going through that same evolution here. We must take this into account. We must

find different kinds of countermeasures like being able to alert our satellites so they can dodge, put defense protection on them or defensive weapons on them, or have extra satellites in the barn where they can go. There are numerous ways to do this. I can only assure you we are studying them all and, I believe, the proper course to take the necessary action. But you should never count on any intelligence source, a human one or technical one, to be free from interference. You've got to always be on your guard.



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